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## 9.7\. Kernel Security Features
The Android Sandbox includes features that use the Security-Enhanced Linux
(SELinux) mandatory access control (MAC) system, seccomp sandboxing, and other
security features in the Linux kernel. Device implementations:
* [C-0-1] MUST maintain compatibility with existing applications, even when
SELinux or any other security features are implemented below the Android
framework.
* [C-0-2] MUST NOT have a visible user interface when a security
violation is detected and successfully blocked by the security feature
implemented below the Android framework, but MAY have a visible user interface
when an unblocked security violation occurs resulting in a successful exploit.
* [C-0-3] MUST NOT make SELinux or any other security features implemented
below the Android framework configurable to the user or app developer.
* [C-0-4] MUST NOT allow an application that can affect another application
through an API (such as a Device Administration API) to configure a policy
that breaks compatibility.
* [C-0-5] MUST split the media framework into multiple processes so that it
is possible to more narrowly grant access for each process as
[described](https://source.android.com/devices/media/framework-hardening.html#arch_changes)
in the Android Open Source Project site.
* [C-0-6] MUST implement a kernel application sandboxing mechanism
which allows filtering of system calls using a configurable policy from
multithreaded programs. The upstream Android Open Source Project meets this
requirement through enabling the seccomp-BPF with threadgroup
synchronization (TSYNC) as described
[in the Kernel Configuration section of source.android.com](http://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/kernel.html#Seccomp-BPF-TSYNC).
Kernel integrity and self-protection features are integral to Android
security. Device implementations:
* [C-0-7] MUST implement kernel stack buffer overflow protections
(e.g. `CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG`).
* [C-0-8] MUST implement strict kernel memory protections where executable
code is read-only, read-only data is non-executable and non-writable, and
writable data is non-executable (e.g. `CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA` or `CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX`).
* [SR] STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to keep kernel data
which is written only during initialization marked read-only after
initialization (e.g. `__ro_after_init`).
* [SR} STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to implement static and dynamic object size
bounds checking of copies between user-space and kernel-space
(e.g. `CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY`).
* [SR] STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to never execute user-space memory when running
in the kernel (e.g. hardware PXN, or emulated via
`CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN` or `CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN`).
* [SR] STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to never read or write user-space memory in the
kernel outside of normal usercopy access APIs (e.g. hardware PAN, or
emulated via `CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN` or `CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN`).
* [SR] STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to randomize the layout of the kernel code and
memory, and to avoid exposures that would compromise the randomization
(e.g. `CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE` with bootloader entropy via the
[`/chosen/kaslr-seed Device Tree node`](https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/chosen.txt)
or [`EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL`](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/efi-rng-protocol)).
If device implementations use a Linux kernel, they:
* [C-1-1] MUST implement SELinux.
* [C-1-2] MUST set SELinux to global enforcing mode.
* [C-1-3] MUST configure all domains in enforcing mode. No permissive mode
domains are allowed, including domains specific to a device/vendor.
* [C-1-4] MUST NOT modify, omit, or replace the neverallow rules present
within the system/sepolicy folder provided in the upstream Android Open Source
Project (AOSP) and the policy MUST compile with all neverallow rules present,
for both AOSP SELinux domains as well as device/vendor specific domains.
* SHOULD retain the default SELinux policy provided in the system/sepolicy
folder of the upstream Android Open Source Project and only further add to this
policy for their own device-specific configuration.
If device implementations use kernel other than Linux, they:
* [C-2-1] MUST use an mandatory access control system that is
equivalent to SELinux.